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An Experiment in the Economic Consequences of Additional 
Disclosure:  
The Case of the Fair Value of Unlisted Equity Investments 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: We investigate the economic consequences of additional disclosure about 
assets with no active market in terms of liquidity, perception of information reliability and 
relevance. We use an experimental design: 181 MBA students are asked to value 24 
investments. We manipulate the level of disclosure on the fair value of assets (Limited versus 
Full), the perception of expected profit (Gain versus Loss) and the firm’s business risk (Low 
versus High). In the case of Limited (resp. Full) disclosure, participants are given a point 
estimate for the fair value of the investment (resp. plus a range of possible fair values). We 
find that in the Full disclosure situation, participants tend to make an offer more frequently, to 
bid prices lower than the fair value and to earn a lower return on their investments compared 
to the Limited disclosure case. These consequences vary with the environment (expected 
profit and risk). 
 
Keywords: fair value; fair value measurement; disclosure; relevance; reliability; risk; SFAS 
157; IFRS 7 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The usefulness and accuracy of fair value measurement (FVM) has been widely and hotly 
debated. From an academic point of view, the evidence is mixed. There is an extensive body 
of literature on the relevance of fair value accounting and fair value disclosure (Barth 1994; 
Barth and Landsman 1995; Barth et al. 1996; Eccher et al. 1996; Park et al. 1999; Barlev and 
Haddad 2003; Landsman 2007). But not all findings are in favor of unrestricted use of fair 
value. For example, using the British real estate and investment fund industries as 
experimental settings where historic cost and fair value accounting can be compared, Danbolt 
and Rees (2008) find that fair values are highly relevant and largely unbiased where values 
are unambiguous. Where values are subject to uncertainty, however, which will normally be 
the case, value relevance will be lower and biased accounting may occur. In other words, the 
relevance of FVMs depends on their reliability. In the same vein, Plantin et al. (2008) show 
that the trade-offs between historical cost and fair value are far from one-sided. While the 
historical cost regime has some inherent inefficiency, marking-to-market can involve other 
types of inefficiencies by injecting an artificial risk that erodes the information value of prices 
and induces suboptimal real decisions. They construct a framework to weigh the pros and 
cons, and find that the damage done by marking-to-market is greatest when claims are (1) 
long-lived, (2) illiquid, and (3) senior.  
Standard-setters are aware of the weaknesses of the fair value approach when no active, 
liquid market exists. This is why SFAS 157 (FASB 2006) distinguishes three levels of fair 
value classified by reliability, according to the inputs needed to compute it. Level 1 
corresponds to the most reliable valuation and level 3 to the least reliable. Level 1 fair value is 
based on the inputs of listed prices for assets (or liabilities) that are identical to the object of 
the valuation, on an active market. Level 2 fair value is derived from listed prices on an active 
market for similar assets, or listed prices for identical assets on an inactive market. Level 3 
fair value is adopted when there is no or hardly any observable market data available. Use of 
information sources not observable on the market is possible, but must reflect the entity’s 
judgment as to the expectations of market participants. The management must make 
assumptions about market actors’ assumptions. For example, to value an unlisted investment 
for which there are no comparable firms, it is possible to use the discounted future cash flows 
anticipated by the firm. Given the difficulty of level 3 valuations, fair value measurement 
must keep use of non-observable data to a minimum. 
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Level 3 fair value valuations have attracted most of the criticism leveled at fair value 
reporting (see, e.g., Benston 2008). For instance, Hitz (2007, 324) observes that “opponents of 
fair value measurement (…) criticize the questionable reliability of fair value measures, 
especially for model-based estimates relying on management’s expectations and projections” 
(emphasis added). As Maines and Wahlen (2006, 399) state, “reliability is an essential 
characteristic for accounting information to be useful for decision making.”  
In this paper, we investigate the economic consequences of additional disclosure about 
assets with no active market (Level 3 fair value measurements). IFRS 7 (IASB 2005) requires 
the disclosure of sensitivity tests for assets with no active market. Such is not the case with 
the American standard SFAS 157 (FASB 2006) that does not require sensitivity tests but 
prescribes a certain degree of disclosure. In practice, as our exploratory study of the annual 
reports of the 10 U.S. and 10 U.K. leading private equity firms shows, firms hardly ever 
publish additional information on FVMs. 
As additional information is rarely published, empirical research on actual firm data is not 
possible. We decided to use an experimental approach to assess the consequences of 
disclosing or not disclosing ranges of fair values.1 181 MBA students participate as fictitious 
investors. Each participant is asked to evaluate a potential investment and to state whether she 
is willing to participate in an auction (bidding at the value she has just decided) given a set of 
information on the fair value of the firm’s assets. Each participant is asked to participate in 24 
rounds. For each round, we manipulate either the level of disclosure on the fair value of assets 
(Limited versus Full disclosure), the expected profit (Gain versus Loss, this variable is labeled 
Domain, consistent with Einhorn and Hogart (1986)) and the firm’s business risk (Low versus 
High). In the case of Limited disclosure, participants are only given the point estimate of the 
fair value of the investment. With Full disclosure, they are given the point estimate of the fair 
value plus a range of possible fair value estimates. We find that when participants are 
provided with Full disclosure, they tend to make an offer more frequently and to deviate more 
importantly from the fair value. They also earn a lower return on their investments compared 
to the case where they are provided with Limited disclosure.  
From an empirical point of view, this paper makes three contributions. First, we find that 
a full disclosure policy has economic consequences in terms of market liquidity (effective 
participation in the market), tends to increase the discount attributed by participants to the 
                                                 
1  Experimental markets are used to investigate the emergence of a disclosure equilibrium because of the 
difficulty of collecting the necessary data to investigate this issue (for instance the information sets of managers, 
investors and competing firms) from naturally occurring markets (King and Wallin 1995, 141). 
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Disclosed Fair Value and lowers their ability to generate returns. Second, these effects vary in 
magnitude depending on the business environment (domain and risk level). Finally, the 
economic consequences of a Full disclosure policy compared to a Limited disclosure policy 
tend to be mixed (more market participation, perception of lower information reliability, and 
lower returns). In other words, we do not find support for the IASB perspective approach on 
disclosure.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some 
background on fair value reporting of unlisted equity investments. We then present the 
theoretical framework that can explain the effect of increased disclosure on decision-making. 
The fourth and fifth sections describe our laboratory experiment, followed by our empirical 
findings. Section six reports supplementary analyses and a discussion in section seven 
concludes the paper. 
II. FAIR VALUE REPORTING OF UNLISTED EQUITY INVESTMENTS 
The regulations on fair value can be analyzed in terms of reporting, measurement and 
disclosure. While Appendix 1 presents the first two aspects (reporting and measurement of 
fair value), we concentrate on disclosure because additional disclosure is presented as one 
solution to the considerable and vivid debate on the usefulness and on the accuracy of FVM, 
especially when there is no active market (Level 3 fair value measurements).  
In the case of no active market, FVMs are based on valuation models and are subject to 
high uncertainty. They represent an opinion about the value of the asset and rely on complex 
models (e.g., DCF, comparables). They are based on assumptions that are not necessarily 
explicit and which could justify the role of additional disclosure. 
Disclosure and Sensitivity Analysis 
Before the implementation of SFAS 157 (FASB 2006), few current accounting 
regulations that require FVM also required disclosures about those measurements. To 
improve transparency in financial reporting, the FASB decided to require expanded 
disclosures on FVMs using significant unobservable inputs and the effects of such 
measurements on earnings (FASB 2006, para. C17). 
More precisely, for assets reported at fair value on a recurring basis in periods subsequent 
to initial recognition, the reporting entity must disclose information that enables users of its 
financial statements to assess the inputs used to develop those measurements; and for 
recurring FVMs using significant unobservable inputs (level 3), the effect of those 
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measurements on earnings (or changes in net assets) for the period must also be disclosed 
(FASB 2006, para. 32). 
However, in the Exposure Draft the Board expressed its view that standardizing such 
disclosures for all assets measured at fair value (for example, requiring disclosure of the 
assumptions used in fair value valuation) would not be practical. The Board noted that in 
some cases, an overwhelming volume of information would need to be disclosed to be 
meaningful. Because sensitivity disclosures rely largely on those assumptions, the Board also 
decided not to require sensitivity disclosures. Instead, the Statement establishes broad 
disclosure objectives, which the Board expects to consider as a basis for requiring more 
specific disclosures in individual accounting pronouncements that require FVMs on a project-
by-project basis (FASB 2006, para. C101). 
Internationally, IFRS 7 (IASB 2005, para. 27) states that “an entity shall disclose: (a) the 
methods and, when a valuation technique is used, the assumptions applied in determining fair 
values of each class of financial assets (…). (c) for fair values that are recognized in the 
financial statements, if changing one or more of those assumptions to reasonably possible 
alternative assumptions would change fair value significantly, the entity shall state this fact 
and disclose the effect of those changes. For this purpose, significance shall be judged with 
respect to profit or loss, and total assets or total liabilities, or, when changes in fair value are 
recognized in equity, total equity. (d) if (c) applies, the total amount of the change in fair 
value estimated using such a valuation technique that was recognized in profit or loss during 
the period.”2 IFRS 7 refers explicitly to sensitivity analysis: “To provide users of financial 
statements with a sense of the potential variability of fair value estimates, the Board decided 
that information about the use of valuation techniques should be disclosed, in particular the 
sensitivities of fair value estimates to the main valuation assumptions” (IASB 2005, para. 
BC38).3 
A group of experts appointed by the IASB (IASB Expert Advisory Panel 2008, 35) 
emphasizes the usefulness of sensitivity disclosure: “the estimation of the fair value of the 
instrument could fall within a range of values depending on the selection of inputs or the 
model used, and the choice of inputs and models might involve significant judgment. For 
                                                 
2 These requirements were added to IAS 32 in 2003 (IASB 2003a, para. 92), and later transferred to IFRS 7 
(IASB 2005). 
3 As an exception to this rule, disclosures of fair value are not required when investments in equity instruments 
are measured at cost, which is the case when the fair value cannot be measured reliably (IASB 2005, para. 29). 
As stated in Appendix 1, and as will be seen later from our survey of annual reports, this exception is rarely 
applied in practice, and investments in equity instruments are usually reported at fair value. 
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example, the valuation could be sensitive to a particular input that might not be observable 
and users might want a quantification of this sensitivity. Transparent disclosure of the 
judgments made helps users understand the significance of the judgments.” In short, the 
FASB has decided not to explicitly require sensitivity disclosures, whereas the IASB has 
decided to require publication of a sensitivity analysis where necessary. 
Disclosure Practices: Annual Report Survey 
We chose the two largest capital markets4 in the world, the U.S. and the U.K., to study the 
disclosure practices of private equity companies. On an exploratory basis, we used the 
Infinancials database 5  to select a sample of 10 companies from each country. 6  Table 1 
provides a disclosure analysis of the annual (or 10-K) reports of these companies for the year 
2007.  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Several common features are visible from this table: 
- All companies state their unlisted investments at fair value. 
- Almost all companies refer to the use of valuation techniques, the exceptions being 
explained by the small proportion of unlisted companies in the total portfolio. Companies 
often refer to valuation “determined in good faith by [the] Board of Directors.” 
Concerning the valuation techniques, American Capital is a representative example. This 
company explains that “the methodologies consist of valuation estimates based on: 
valuations of comparable public companies, recent sales of comparable companies, 
discounting the forecasted cash flows of the portfolio company, the liquidation or 
collateral value of the portfolio company’s assets, third party valuations of the portfolio 
company, third party sale offers to buy, potential strategic buyer analysis and the value of 
recent investments in the equity securities of the portfolio company.” 
- While all the companies, apart from a few British companies, report the cost and the fair 
value of each investment (or of major investments) separately, they almost never disclose 
                                                 
4 Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSL2224181520070623. 
5 Available at www.infinancials.com. We chose this database because it contains an extensive library of annual 
reports available in PDF format. 
6 We drew the selection from the ICB “Equity investment instruments” Sector, adding “private equity” in the key 
words. At the time of the extraction, we retrieved 19 U.S. companies and 21 U.K. companies. We selected the 10 
largest companies (sorted by total assets). All annual reports were available either from the Infinancials database 
or the company’s website. We searched for the terms “range”, “sensitivity”, “tests”, “valuation of investments”, 
“valuation of portfolio investments” and “valuation of portfolio securities”. In addition, for the fullest coverage 
of information, we read the entire text of the annual reports.  
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the valuation technique associated with each (or each major) investment, again with the 
exception of a few British companies. 
- In almost all the annual reports studied, there is no reference to sensitivity tests 
concerning the determination of the fair value of investments.7 One interesting exception 
is a British company, SVG Capital, which discloses the following information: “A 
sensitivity analysis has been performed on the valuations of the 20 largest underlying 
investee companies, which had an aggregate valuation (before providing for carried 
interest) of £1,157.0 million or 85.0% of the gross private equity portfolio valuation (…), 
the results of which are set out in the table below”:  
 Fair value  
£ millions 
Hypothetical fair 
value  
(10% uplift) 
£ millions 
Hypothetical fair 
value 
(10% write-down) 
£ millions 
31 December 2007     
Gross valuation of 20 largest investee 
companies  
1,157.0 1,370.2 
 
936.8 
 
Change in valuation/effect on income  +18.4% -19.0 
 
- With the exception of the above-mentioned company, the sampled companies never 
publish a range of values. 
In summary, from this exploratory study, we can conclude that companies do not publish 
any sensitivity analysis, which rules out any empirical study based on sensitivity figures. This 
explains the usefulness of a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of 
additional disclosure on FVMs.  
Our survey of disclosure practices is consistent which Michaels (2004) who points out 
that the SEC “has told companies repeatedly that annual reports need more details on the 
estimates and assumptions behind the numbers.” An SEC executive even added that the SEC 
wanted companies to “lay out what would happen under certain future scenarios”, which this 
executive called a “sensitivity analysis” (Michaels 2004). 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this paper, we examine how investors react to additional disclosure on fair values. 
Modeled fair value is by nature uncertain as it aggregates a distribution of probabilities in one 
single point estimate. Disclosing a range of fair values is similar to providing information on 
this distribution.  
                                                 
7 A few companies mention the “interest rate sensitivity”, i.e. the change in earnings that may result from 
changes in the level of interest rates. 
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Modeled fair value: a type of “vague” information 
Financial statements and the terms and rules used in accounting are affected to varying 
degrees by the uncertainty of the information disclosed (March 1987). Godfrey et al. (2003, 
19) recall that “even numbers that many regards as ‘objective’ and ‘verifiable’ are mere 
abstractions of a financial world that is complex, unsystematic and imprecise.” The concept of 
“vague information” encompasses two distinct types of imprecision—about the potential 
outcomes and about their underlying probabilities (Du and Budescu 2005, 1791). For instance, 
the widely used term ambiguity refers to imprecisely specified probabilities (Ellsberg 1961). 
As Godfrey et al. (2003, 82) put it, “the problem of vagueness of the attribute is not 
uncommon in accounting.” For example, in accounting practices, vague information can be 
found in the “risk disclosures”, like sensitivity tests, VaRs (Value at Risk) ranges (Hodder et 
al. 2001), and also in accounting estimates, like a modeled fair value, which is by nature 
vague, as it aggregates a distribution of probabilities in one single point estimate. 
Investment behavior and vagueness avoidance 
Previous literature shows that when investors are confronted with vague information, they 
tend to adopt a “vagueness avoidance” behavior (Du and Budescu 2005). Ellsberg (1961) 
illustrated this notion: in a lottery setting, people overwhelmingly favour a lottery with known 
probabilities and will even pay to avoid the ambiguous lottery (e.g., Ellsberg 1961; Curley et 
al. 1986) even though a normative model of decision making would prescribe indifference 
between the lotteries (Camerer and Weber 1992). Vagueness avoidance has been invoked to 
explain anomalies and irregularities in investment behavior (Mukerji and Tallon 2001; Chen 
and Epstein 2002). It has been documented in individual settings (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986), 
laboratory settings (Sarin and Weber 1993), and field settings (Hogarth and Kunreuther 1989).  
Disclosure about a vague information and investors’ behavior 
In this paper, we examine how investors react to additional disclosure on fair values. With 
regard to sensitivity disclosure, the position of the above-mentioned group of experts 
appointed by the IASB (IASB Expert Advisory Panel 2008, 35) is consistent with the idea 
that modeled fair value is vague by nature and this vagueness should be reduced by disclosing 
additional information on the level of vagueness (like for instance a range of possible fair 
values, or a sensitivity test). 
However what could be the investors’ behavior? Do they perceive the additional 
disclosure of the range of fair values as a reducer of vagueness, as the standard-setters do? In 
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this case, the range of fair values can be interpreted as presenting the “limits” to the vagueness 
of the fair value figure. Alternatively, do investors view additional disclosure as an amplifier 
of vagueness because it emphasizes the imprecision of the fair value estimate? 
Empirical results mentioned above let this question open, as they all rely on a vague/non 
vague information comparison. For example, Du and Budescu (2005) compare a point versus 
confidence interval and Hirst et al. (1999) study the form of a forecast (point or range 
forecasts). In the context of environmental liabilities, Kennedy et al. (1998) investigate the 
impact of the disclosure of a best estimate, a range, the minimum or the maximum. 
Conversely, our paper differs from previous settings in the sense that participants do not have 
the choice between two measures with different levels of vagueness. Participants are provided 
either with vague information (the fair value estimate) or with this vague information plus 
information on the level of vagueness (i.e., point estimate plus range of values). Therefore, 
how this information affects investors’ decisions and performance is an open issue. To 
address it, we concentrate on three economic consequences of additional disclosure: market 
liquidity, perception of information reliability and information relevance. 
Market liquidity 
From an economic point of view, increased disclosure is associated with lower 
information asymmetry and greater willingness to invest (Akerlof 1970; Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991). Empirical literature generally supports this view. Bushee and Leuz (2005) 
document that in the case of a regulatory change mandating OTCBB firms to comply with 
reporting requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, firms previously filing in 
compliance with the SEC disclosure requirements experience positive stock returns and 
permanent increases in liquidity, suggesting positive externalities from disclosure regulations. 
Bailey et al. (2006), find that volume reactions to earnings announcements typically increase 
significantly once a company cross-lists in the U.S., and this change is related to the level of 
disclosure.  
Information also increases confidence in judgments (Gill et al. 1998; Hall et al. 2007). As 
investors estimate the parameters needed to make their decision based on available 
information, their confidence level depends on the attributes of their information set (Botosan 
2006, 33). Heath and Tversky (1991) have shown that people prefer to bet on events about 
which they have some expertise than on random chance events or on events they feel ignorant 
about. 
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Both theories are consistent with the idea that high levels of disclosure are more likely to 
attract investors and thereby increase liquidity of the firm’s stock. Therefore we state our first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Additional disclosure is positively associated with market liquidity. 
Perception of reliability of accounting numbers 
We postulate that the closer to the point estimate of the fair value the participants bid, the 
higher the perceived reliability of accounting numbers. The effect of disclosing a range of fair 
values (in addition to a point estimate) on the perceived reliability of accounting numbers is 
uncertain.  
On the one hand, an investment decision is by nature complex. In this situation, 
individuals provided by too much information tend to reach information overload (Schick et 
al. 1990) and as recalled by Kennedy et al. (1998), decision makers faced with uncertainty 
tend to use fairly simple but generally functional heuristics and decision rules. Additional 
information is not always incorporated into the decision process. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1982) propose an anchoring and adjustment heuristic. With this heuristic, individuals make 
estimates by starting from an initial known value (e.g., the point estimate) that is adjusted to 
yield the final estimate, that is biased toward (anchored by) the initial value. Research in 
psychology predicts that point estimate will be seen as more precise than range of values 
(Hirst et al. 1999). This is why we expect an investor provided with full information to offer a 
bid price close to the point estimate.  
On the other hand, providing a range makes salient both higher and lower possible values, 
whereas a point estimate provides only one anchor value (Highhouse 1994). This is why we 
expect investors to give more weight to their beliefs and/or other information to deviate from 
the point estimate when provided with full information. Moreover, previous studies 
consistently demonstrate that when investors face vagueness, they tend to require a higher 
premium to compensate for the additional uncertainty (Mukerji and Tallon 2001; Chen and 
Epstein 2002).  
Given the conflicting expectations provided by our theoretical framework (anchoring vs. 
uncertainty effect), we state our second hypothesis in a non-directional form: 
H2: Additional disclosure is associated with the perception of information reliability. 
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Return 
We postulate that information is relevant if it enables participants to earn a positive return. 
The effect of disclosing a range of fair values (in addition to a point estimate) on the ability of 
participants to earn positive returns is uncertain. On the one hand, a maximum amount of 
information is necessary for good investment decisions. When a firm commits to increased 
levels of disclosure, the potential for information asymmetries to arise between the 
management of the firm and its shareholders or among buyers and sellers of the firm’s shares 
diminishes (Bailey et al. 2006, 176). Informative disclosure provides an opportunity for a 
decision-maker to obtain an incremental improvement in assessing the real prospects for an 
enterprise. Nonowner investors benefit from the lower information risk of making an error in 
allocating their resources (Elliott and Jacobson 1994).  
On the other hand, Huber et al. (2008) show that having more information than others 
does not always lead to higher returns when trading on financial markets. Hall et al. (2007) 
provide explanations for this potential underperformance. First, more information often 
increases confidence in judgment even if the accuracy of judgment is not affected. Second, 
additional information may render other information less salient and ultimately decrease the 
accuracy of predictions. Altogether, these two effects create an “illusion of knowledge” that 
leads to poorer decisions. 
Given these conflicting predictions, we state our third hypothesis in a non-directional 
form: 
H3: Additional disclosure is associated with information relevance. 
Interaction with the characteristics of the environment 
These three hypotheses illustrate the economic consequences of additional disclosure. 
However, uncertainty impacts the decision maker’s behavior (Kahneman et al. 1982). 
Decision makers tend to use heuristics to simplify the judgment task, which could be hindered 
by biases (Hogarth and Makridakis 1981; Einhorn and Hogarth 1986) and limitations in their 
information processing capacities (Miller 1956; Schroder et al. 1967; Newell and Simon 
1972). Consequently, many have presumed that an explicit disclosure of the information 
uncertainty should aid decision-making. In their analysis of previous experimental research on 
the usefulness of the disclosure of confidence intervals, Foong et al. (2003) show that 
probabilistic information disclosure enhanced decision performance as it helps decreasing 
task complexity.  
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Professional regulatory bodies advocate for additional disclosures in the case of complex 
decision making processes. Such additional disclosure mentioned above concerning the group 
of experts appointed by the IASB (IASB Expert Advisory Panel 2008) is expected to mitigate 
task complexity, because the decision accuracy of heuristics tends to decrease as task 
complexity increases (Thorngate 1980; Johnson and Payne 1985).  
Moreover, many empirical results have demonstrated that one main determinant of 
attitude towards vagueness is the perceived loss/gain outcomes (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986). 
For instance, Du and Budescu (2005) show that, when investors face investment options with 
vague information, they exhibit a stronger concern for vagueness in the domain of gains than 
in the domain of losses, and they can be indifferent or vagueness seeking in the domain of 
losses, which is consistent with previous findings (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Camerer and 
Weber 1992; Budescu et al. 2002).  
Given that we form no expectation on whether or not information on the range of possible 
value in addition to a point estimate increases or decreases the level of vagueness, we posit a 
non directional hypothesis: 
H4a: Economic consequences of additional disclosure interact with the domain. 
As recalled by Du and Budescu (2005), prior research has found that individual attitudes 
toward risk and toward vagueness are not closely associated and that attitude toward 
vagueness is an important, distinct, and independent factor in decision behavior (Chen and 
Epstein 2002). Consequently, we also allow the level of risk to vary in our experimental 
design. We state a non directional hypothesis: 
H4b: Economic consequences of additional disclosure interact with the riskiness of the 
environment. 
In the next section, we will test these hypotheses on information disclosed on fair value. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
In this paper, the aim of our experiment is to examine the effect of additional information 
on fair values (publication of a range of fair values in addition to a point estimate of the 
asset’s fair value) on investors’ decisions to purchase securities and their consequences.  
Organization of the Experiment 
Each experimental session consists of a series of 24 single-period call auctions (called 
“rounds”). Participants (the “investors” or “subjects”) are asked to invest in 24 unlisted 
companies. During each round, the subjects have the opportunity to buy one and only one 
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“share” for cash, in a written single call auction.8 At each round, they can choose whether or 
not to participate in the call auction. 
For each auction, we manipulate three variables: Disclosure, Domain and Risk. 
Disclosure can be either “Limited Disclosure” (disclosure of a point estimate corresponding 
to a single fair value) or “Full Disclosure” (disclosure of the point estimate fair value and the 
minimum-maximum range). Note that the point estimate (also called the “single estimate”) is 
the best estimate of the fair value of the asset, and it corresponds to the accounting value of 
the asset under both IASB and FASB regulations (see Appendix 1 for details). As in Du and 
Budescu (2005), all decisions in the experiment are set in a context where the options are 
naturally framed as potential gains or potential losses through simple comparisons with an 
implicit benchmark ($1,000 per share – see Appendix 2). The domain is a gain (loss) if the 
difference between this benchmark and the point estimate of fair value is positive (negative). 
Note that the benchmark is explicitly disclosed to participants before each auction. Risk is 
overall business risk assessment and is explicitly disclosed to participant. The Risk variable 
can take two values: “Low Risk” or “High Risk”. The explicit disclosure of the risk level is 
also supported by other elements given to participants: for instance, “Low Risk” firms 
distribute dividends whereas “High risk” do not. In the same vein, “Low Risk” firms tend to 
operate in “brick and mortar” industries, whereas “High Risk” firms operate in new 
technology.  
The variable of interest is Disclosure as we measure the economic consequences of 
Disclosure (Limited versus Full) when the domain of the decisions (gains and losses) and the 
business conditions (captured by Risk) vary. 
Each participant experiences all 24 scenarios.9 The 24 scenarios are organized in 12 pairs 
of scenarios that are fully comparable in terms of Domain and Risk but differ in terms of 
Disclosure. This means that the same description (business description, salient facts and 
income) will occur twice, once for the Limited disclosure scenario and once for the Full 
disclosure scenario. The two scenarios will be referred to as a pair (see an example in 
Appendix 3). Hence, we have a 2 (cases of disclosure) x 2 (domains) x 2 (categories of Risk) 
within-subjects experimental design.10 Each participant experiences 3 times each of the 8 
                                                 
8 The single call auction market has already been used in previous experimental studies (Calegari and Fargher 
1997, 407-408). 
9 The scenarios were developed using the 2006 actual portfolio of Northern Investors Company Plc., a U.K. 
listed private equity firm. 
10  “Within-subjects (or ‘repeated-measures’ designs) where subjects provide more than one observation, 
generally enhance statistical power by allowing control of between-subjects differences” (Libby et al. 2002, 804). 
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possible combinations, leading to 24 different rounds. The 24 scenarios (12 pairs of scenarios) 
are proposed in a random order, different for each participant, to control for recency bias.  
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Chow et al. 1996), the first seven rounds are used 
as a learning phase and the last three may contain biases due to opportunistic behavior by 
subjects in closing the game, which leaves 14 usable rounds. 181 subjects participate to the 
experiment. Out of the 4,344 possible rounds (181 participants * 24 rounds), only 2,534 
rounds are available for the experiment (181 * 14 rounds). Since combinations of Disclosure, 
Domain and Risk are constructed so that the Limited and Full disclosure scenarios can be 
compared directly, we then have to reconstruct pairs of similar scenario except in terms of 
Disclosure. We end up with 840 complete pairs, or 1,680 observations. In order to perform a 
repeated Anova (see later), we average the three decisions taken by the participants on each 
combination of Disclosure, Domain and Risk. 11  Because the 1,680 observations do not 
include three decisions per participant for each of the eight combinations, as we drop 10 
rounds out of 24, the resulting sample, after averaging, includes 577 complete pairs, 
representing 1,154 observations. 
Experimental Design 
At the start of the session, a general information questionnaire is distributed on the 
subject’s age, educational qualifications, experience, gender and risk behavior. 12  Each 
participant receives the same preliminary information included in Appendix 213 and plays 24 
rounds. Each round proceeds as shown in Figure 1. For each round, participants are informed 
that “the value of the company’s shares is around $1,000”, so as to create a “benchmark” 
against which they can assess the expected gain by acquiring the share. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
1. For each round, a brief description of the firm (Audited financial information and 
Business environment) is presented (see Appendix 3). We also provide the participant 
with the point estimate, which is an ex ante valuation of the fair value of the firm (e.g., 
995 for Union Food, see Appendix 3, Panel A). The participant has to assess the value of 
the firm, i.e., evaluate the investment. After reviewing summarized financial information 
                                                 
11 As mentioned above, each participant repeats three times the eight combinations of Disclosure, Domain and 
Risk. 
12 Investor risk aversion has been proved to influence investment behavior: conservative investors (with greater 
risk aversion) demand higher risk premiums whereas speculators (with lower risk aversion) accept greater price 
volatility (Ang and Schwarz 1985). We therefore include the subject’s risk aversion as a control variable and 
find (in untabulated results) that the inclusion of this variable does not qualitatively affect our results. 
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on the firm, she must post her bid price (the maximum amount of money she is willing to 
invest to buy the share) (Question 1 – see Appendix 2).  
2. The participant is then asked if she wishes to participate in an auction for the share. 
(Question 2). If she does not participate, the round is over and the total value of her 
portfolio is unchanged from the previous round. 
3. If she participates, market conditions are modeled (see Appendix 4)14 and the participant 
may win or lose the auction if she decides to make a bid. If the participant’s bid has an 
associated probability (calculated based on normal distribution, with mean 1000 and 
standard deviation 100 or 250, depending on the level of risk) greater than 0.4, then she 
will win the auction. 
4. If the offer is accepted, the modeled value (market value)15 of the share (see Appendix 4) 
is disclosed to the participant and a gain or loss is computed as the difference between the 
market value and the bid price. If higher than the valuation from step 1, the participant 
makes a gain equal to the market value minus her bid price; if lower than the valuation 
from step 1 (bid price), the participant makes a loss. If the participant wins the auction, 
this gain (loss) is added to (subtracted from) her capital ($24,000 at the beginning of the 
simulation). If she loses the auction, her capital is not affected (see Figure 1). 
5. There are no transaction costs. 
Proxies for Economic Consequences 
Our goal is to examine the economic consequences, if any, of Disclosure levels (Limited 
versus Full) when the domain of the decisions and the business conditions (complexity of the 
environment captured by Risk) vary. We analyzed in the hypothesis development three 
economic consequences: liquidity, reliability and relevance.  
To measure liquidity, we assess the participant’s willingness to make an offer. More 
precisely, we code the participant’s answer to step 2 (“Are you willing or not to make an 
offer?”). We use a binary variable Offer coded one if the participant is willing to make an 
offer and zero otherwise. At the aggregate level, if more participants are willing to make an 
offer (i.e., if the average value of Offer is closer to one), then liquidity increases.  
                                                                                                                                                        
13 As is standard procedure, before administering the final version of the research instrument, we ran a pilot test 
on a group of potential subjects to validate the design (see Holm and Rikhardsson 2008, 544). 
14 The investments are not listed. The “market” conditions mentioned in the text correspond to the modeling of 
the result of the single-period call auctions.  
15 This is not a real “market” value in the sense that the investments are not listed. This value corresponds to the 
value modeled as the result of the call auction process. For the sake of simplicity, we will use the term “market 
value” in the rest of the paper. 
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The second economic consequence investigated is the perception of information 
reliability. We seek to examine whether or not participants rely more on accounting numbers 
when they are provided with Full disclosure compared to the case when they are just provided 
with a point estimate. In a way, we examine the reliability of accounting information from a 
user perspective: we expect that participants will offer bid prices closer to the disclosed fair 
value as they see higher reliability of this accounting number. To capture their perception of 
information reliability, we use a variable labeled Deviation from Disclosed Fair Value 
(Deviation in short). Deviation is computed as the difference between the bid price of the 
participant from step 1 minus the point estimate of the Disclosed Fair Value (DFV) of the 
share, scaled by this DFV of the share to allow comparisons. For instance, if a participant 
proposes a value of 999 whereas the point estimate was 995, Deviation is 0.40% (=[999-
995]/995).16 Deviation captures how the bid price proposed by the participants deviate from 
the accounting fair value of the asset. If Deviation is positive (resp. negative), the participant 
tends to bid over (resp. under) the fair value. Deviation is computed only for rounds for which 
the participant decided to make an offer. 
The last economic consequence is the relevance of additional disclosure. We seek to 
examine if participants are more able to earn a return when they are provided with Full 
disclosure. We label Return the variable that measures the return on investment for each 
round. If participants decided to make an offer (step 2) and if this offer was accepted (step 3), 
then Return is computed as the difference between the market value of the asset as simulated 
by our experimental model (step 4)17 and the bid price proposed by the participant, scaled by 
this bid price to allow comparisons. If participants decided not to make an offer (step 2) or if 
their offer was rejected (step 3), Return is set to zero. Note that Return is defined for all 
rounds whatever may be the status of the offer (accepted or rejected). Appendix 4 proposes an 
example of the measurement of Return. 
Participants 
The market participants were 181 student volunteers recruited from MBA classes18 at two 
universities (Institution A and Institution B).19 Participants are provided with incentives to 
                                                 
16 See Appendices 3 and 4 for a detailed presentation. 
17 This value could be equivalent to the price proposed by another investor one year later.  
18 The study by Elliott et al. (2007) shows that using MBA students as a proxy for nonprofessional investors is a 
valid methodological choice. In addition, Holm and Rikhardsson (2008) recall that “students are not relevant 
subjects (surrogates) for all empirical research areas, but for certain tasks involving information processing and 
decision-making, university students make decisions that approximate those made by the rest of the general 
population (see Ashton and Kramer 1980; Liyanarachchi and Milne 2005).” 
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submit accurate privately formulated estimates of the firm’s fair value: the top four results (in 
each institution) will each receive a $225 reward.20 The investors’ performance is assessed as 
follows: the sum of their initial endowment plus the gain (loss) from the purchase of the 
shares equals the total value of their portfolio at the end the period.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
As shown in Table 2, which provides some demographic data, on average, participants 
are 29.55 years old (ages range from 23 to 45) and they all have some professional experience. 
Their backgrounds are diverse but most of them graduated in Business, Economics and/or 
Science. In addition, before joining their MBA course 67% had had some formal education 
in Accounting, 43% in Financial analysis and 57% in Corporate finance. Approximately 
one third of the participants had worked in a finance-related field (accounting, audit, 
management control, banking or investment banking). Before participating in the 
experiment, they all attended an accounting course: they are all familiar with the notions of 
balance sheet, income statement, fair value, market value and book value. These 
background analyses help reinforce the validity of our study, as Elliott et al. (2007) point 
out that researchers should give careful consideration to aligning a task’s integrative 
complexity with the appropriate level of MBA student. Their analysis proves that MBA 
students who have completed their core MBA courses and are enrolled in or have 
completed a financial statement analysis course are a good proxy for nonprofessional 
investors in tasks that are relatively low in integrative complexity.  
V. RESULTS 
We present our results according to our three main hypotheses: market liquidity, 
perception of information reliability and relevance of additional disclosure. 
Market liquidity 
Table 3 presents all the tests referring to hypothesis H1 (positive association between 
additional disclosure and market liquidity) and hypotheses H4a and H4b as applied in 
conjunction with H1 (the effect of Disclosure on Offer varies with the domain of the decisions 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 The names of the institutions involved in the experiment are withheld to maintain anonymity in the blind 
review process. As a robustness check, we included the institution as an additional factor. Findings are 
qualitatively similar.  
20 “Experiments testing responses to economic theory need to provide performance-contingent incentives in 
order to induce subjects to possess the incentives assumed by the economic model” (Libby et al. 2002, 803). 
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and the risk). The dependent variable for these hypotheses is Offer (willingness to make an 
offer) which constitutes, as explained above, a proxy for market liquidity.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
As a first pass on H1, we compare the proportion of offers made by participants in the 
Full disclosure cases compared to the Limited disclosure cases. Participants make an offer in 
93.4% of the cases when provided with Limited disclosure versus 95.6% of the cases when 
provided with Full disclosure. Using a Paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we find the 
difference to be significant (z = -2.608, p < 0.01). Our sample is based on 577 complete pairs 
(see Table 3, Panel A). We remind that a “complete pair” of scenarios includes for a given 
participant21, two scenarios with the same domain and the same level of risk. The only 
difference between the two scenarios is the level of disclosure: Limited in one case and Full in 
the other.22 The use of this technique (paired samples Wilcoxon signed-rank test) allows 
measuring the impact of Disclosure on Offer all other things being equal. In other words, 
reporting a range of fair values rather than only a point estimate of the fair value is associated 
with a higher tendency to make an offer. This result is consistent with H1. As discussed 
previously, the provision of additional disclosure is more likely to attract investors which feel 
more confident.  
According to H4a and H4b, we expect the influence of disclosure on offer to vary with 
Domain (Gain versus Loss) and Risk (High versus Low). We use a 3-way factorial Anova 
model with repeated measures of Disclosure, Domain and Risk to test the significance of these 
interactions. Panel C reports results of this Anova whereas panel B tabulates the mean 
(standard deviation) of Offer for each case of information (Limited versus Full), domain (Gain 
versus Loss) and level of risk (High versus Low).  
Panel C reveals that Disclosure and Domain main effects are significant. Consistent with 
H1 and Panel A, participants make offers more frequently when they are provided with Full 
disclosure. Consistent with intuition, participants make offers more frequently when their 
perception of profit is positive (domain = Gain) rather than negative. The interaction term 
Disclosure x Domain is also significant (see Table 3, Panel C). This means that the different 
levels of disclosure do not have the same impact on Offer depending on the nature of Domain 
(Gain or Loss). Panel B reveals that increased disclosure translates into a higher rate of offer 
                                                 
21 We remind that we average the three decisions taken by each participant for each of the eight possible 
combinations of Disclosure, Domain and Risk. 
22 An example of pair is given in Appendix 3. 
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(more market participation) in the loss domain, whereas in the gain domain, the rate of offer is 
fairly constant whatever may be the level of disclosure.  
The three way interaction terms between Disclosure x Risk x Domain is insignificant. The 
effect of disclosure conditional of the expectation of profit (gain or loss) is not affected by the 
level of risk. This is confirmed by Panel D of Table 3 that tabulates output of a simple Anova 
of Offer and Disclosure for each combination of Domain (Gain versus Loss) and Risk (Low 
versus High) (see Panel D). We only find a marginally significant difference between the 
impact of Limited and Full disclosure on Offer when the domain is a loss and the risk is high 
(84.9% vs. 91.1% [see Panel B], F = 2.854, p < 0.10).  
Perception of information reliability 
Table 4 presents all the tests referring to hypothesis H2 (association between additional 
disclosure and perception of information reliability) and hypothesis H4 as applied in 
conjunction with H2 (interaction with the domain of the decisions and the risk). The 
dependent variable for these hypotheses is Deviation, as defined earlier in the paper, which 
constitutes, as explained above, a proxy for the perception of information reliability.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
To test H2, we first compare the level of Deviation for pairs of scenarios of Full and 
Limited disclosure holding constant other factors (Domain and Risk). Our findings are based 
on a sample of 541 complete pairs (see Table 4, Panel A). This figure is lower than the 
number of pairs displayed in Table 3, Panel A, because we can only use complete pairs when 
the participants decided to make an offer. Participants will more deviate from the DFV in the 
Full disclosure cases compared to the Limited disclosure cases (-3.3% versus -2.5%). 
According to a Paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test, this difference is significant (z = 3.511, p < 
0.01). In other words, reporting a range of fair values rather than only a point estimate of the 
fair value is associated with a higher tendency to offer a bid price lower than the Disclosed 
Fair Value. This result is consistent with the idea that providing a range of values makes more 
salient negative news, as represented by the lower bound of the range (Highhouse 1994). 
When provided with full disclosure, participants impose a higher discount on DFV.  
As hypothesis H4 must be tested in conjunction with H2 (the economic consequence of 
additional disclosure interact with Domain and Risk), we first present the mean (standard 
deviation) for Deviation by domain and level of risk (see Panel B). To analyze the Deviation 
by disclosure level, domain and level of risk, we use a 3-way factorial Anova model with 
repeated measures of Disclosure, Domain and Risk. Panel C report our findings.  
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All three main effects are significant. The level of disclosure influences the Deviation. 
Panel B reveals that in the full disclosure case, participants tend to underbid more than in the 
Limited disclosure case. This is consistent with view that additional disclosure “reveals” bad 
news, leading participants to impose a higher discount on DFV. Consistent with intuition, 
participants bid price closer from the DFV in the gain domain than in the loss domain. 
Participants also propose higher prices when risk is higher, consistent with economic theory.  
Hypothesis H4 predicts a significant interaction between Disclosure and Domain, and 
between Disclosure and Risk. All interaction terms but Domain x Risk (that is not however 
central in our analysis) are significant. (see Table 4, Panel C). This means that the different 
levels of disclosure do not have the same impact on Deviation depending on the level of Risk 
(Low or High). In order to further investigate the relationship between Disclosure and 
Deviation, we run a simple Anova for each combination of Domain (Gain versus Loss) and 
risk (Low and High) (see Panel D). We find a significant difference between the impact of 
Limited and Full disclosure on Deviation when the domain is a gain and the risk is low (-0.5% 
vs. -1.4% [see Panel B], F = 8.709, p < 0.01) and when the domain is a loss and the risk is 
high (-6.8% vs. -9.1%, F = 11.632, p < 0.01). In other words, Full disclosure induces a more 
conservative behavior of participants due to vagueness avoidance. Note however that the 
behavior of investors is asymmetric for high risk and low risk with regards to the domain. 
Relevance 
In Table 5, we analyze the effect of Disclosure on the ability of participants to earn a 
return. The dependent variable for these hypotheses is Return which constitutes, as explained 
above, a proxy for the relevance of additional disclosure.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
To test H3, we first compare the return earned by participants for each level of Disclosure 
holding constant Risk and Domain. Our sample is based on 577 pairs (see Table 5, Panel A). 
When participants are provided with the range of fair value estimates, the return is on average 
0.30% lower than when participants are only provided with a point estimate (1% vs. 0.7%). A 
paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test, reveals that this difference is significant (z = 3.000, p < 
0.01). In other words, reporting a range of fair values rather than only a point estimate of the 
fair value is associated with a tendency to earn a lower return. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Hall et al. (2007) who state that having more information creates an “illusion 
of knowledge” which leads to poorer decisions. In our setting, this might be explained by two 
factors. First, participants when provided with Full disclosure tend to offer lower bid prices 
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(see findings on H2). As a consequence, their offers tend to be over rejected biasing returns 
towards zero. Second, when participants are provided with Full disclosure and when their 
offer is accepted, they tend to have higher bid prices leading to lower returns.  
Panel B of Table 5 tabulates the mean (standard deviation) for Return by domain and 
level of risk. To explore the significance of the interactions between Disclosure, Domain and 
Risk, we implement use a 3-way factorial Anova model on the sample corresponding to the 
complete pairs (1,154 observations, see Table 5, Panel C) with repeated measures of 
Disclosure, Domain and Risk.  
Panel C reports our findings. All main effects are significant. Consistent with H3, return 
varies (negatively) with the level of disclosure. Consistent with expectations, participants earn 
a higher return when risk is high and when domain is a gain (see Panel B). H4a and H4b 
predict a significant interaction between Disclosure and Domain and between Disclosure and 
Risk, and between Disclosure, Domain and Risk. Findings are consistent with all these 
predictions. This means that the different levels of disclosure do not have the same impact on 
Return depending on the Domain (Gain versus Loss) and nature of Risk (Low or High).  
In order to further investigate the relationship between Disclosure and Return, we run a 
simple Anova for each combination of Domain (Gain versus Loss) and Risk (Low and High) 
(see Panel D). Panel D presents the joint effect of disclosure, the domain and the level of risk 
on the return earned. Interestingly for our analysis, disclosure has an effect only when the 
domain is a gain and the level of risk is high. In this case, when participants are provided with 
the range of fair value estimates, the return is on average 0.7% lower than when participants 
are only provided with a point estimate (2.6% versus 1.4% [see Panel B], F = 15.273, p < 
0.01).  
VI. SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our findings to one alternative measure of 
economic consequences: the criterion used to determine if the auction is successful or not 
(step 3 of each auction). In the current setting, the offer is accepted if the price bid by the 
participant is superior to a threshold based on a normal distribution and the risk level (see 
Appendix 4 for details). This mechanism has common features with the one proposed in the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marshak method (see Becker et al. 1964). Participants do not compete 
directly between them to win the auction but they play against a statistical distribution 
(Gaussian law). This setting has the advantage of simplicity. One limit is that we do not 
incorporate all participants’ beliefs to model the acceptance or rejection of each offer. An 
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alternative would be to consider that the offer is accepted if the price bid by the participant is 
superior to median bid price of all participants for the pair of comparable scenarios. In this 
case, we interpret individual bid prices as a reservation price: at this price participants are 
indifferent to selling (or buying) one share or receiving their bid price in cash. Therefore the 
median bid price for each pair of scenarios “clears the market” because, at this price, 50% of 
the participants are willing to sell shares and 50% are willing to buy shares.  
We checked the robustness of our findings if we change the acceptance criteria (Is the bid 
price superior to a modeled value versus to the median bid price?): findings are similar (and 
not tabulated for the sake of clarity) and reinforce our confidence in the reported results.  
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The introduction of FVM for assets and liabilities listed on an active market is now 
commonly accepted. Its extension to unlisted assets (level 3 valuations) is more questionable 
and has spurred considerable debate (see Nissim and Penman 2008). SFAS 157 suggests that 
increased disclosure is an answer to the lack of reliability of level 3 fair valuations. This 
premise is important, as impaired reliability is associated with lower relevance of the measure 
(see Maines and Wahlen 2006, 399). The goal of our experiment is to challenge this view. We 
ask 181 MBA students to value a sequence of 24 distinct potential investments. For each 
investment, we manipulate the level of disclosure on the fair value of assets (Limited versus 
Full disclosure), the domain of the decisions (gains versus losses) and the firm’s business risk 
(Low versus High). In the case of Limited disclosure, participants are only given the point 
estimate of the fair value of the investment. With Full disclosure, they are given the point 
estimate of the fair value plus a range of possible fair value estimates. We find that Full 
disclosure is associated with a change in (1) investors’ market participation, (2) their 
perception of information reliability and (3) their capacity to earn returns on their investments. 
Taken together, these findings make three contributions. First, they suggest that a full 
disclosure policy has economic consequences in terms of liquidity (effective participation in 
the market), perception of information reliability, and ability to generate returns. Second, 
these effects vary in magnitude with the domain of the decision and risk of the business 
environment. Finally, the economic consequences of a Full disclosure policy compared to a 
Limited disclosure policy tend to be mixed (more market participation but lower returns). In 
other words, we do not find support for the economic perspective approach on disclosure that 
underlies the IASB regulations. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Regulation on Fair value and Fair Value Disclosure 
Relevance and reliability are considered by the FASB (1980) and the IASB (see IASC 
1989) as two of the primary qualities that make accounting information useful for decision-
making. Both standard-setting bodies provide a similar definition of these concepts. In the 
U.S., “relevant accounting information is capable of making a difference in a decision by 
helping users to form predictions about the outcomes of past, present, and future events or to 
confirm or correct prior expectations” (FASB 1980, 5). At the international level, “to be 
useful, information must be relevant to the decision-making needs of users. Information has 
the quality of relevance when it influences the economic decisions of users by helping them 
evaluate past, present or future events or confirming, or correcting, their past evaluations” 
(IASC 1989, para. 26).  
However, to be useful, information must also be reliable. In the U.S., “the reliability of a 
measure rests on the faithfulness with which it represents what it purports to represent, 
coupled with an assurance for the user that it has that representational quality” (FASB 1980, 
5). Internationally, “information has the quality of reliability when it is free from material 
error and bias and can be depended upon by users to represent faithfully that which it either 
purports to represent or could reasonably be expected to represent” (IASC 1989, para. 31). 
The question of the treatment of unlisted equity securities, and specifically the provision 
of disclosures, falls directly into the debate on the trade-off between relevance and reliability. 
U.S. GAAP and IFRS have adopted a similar, but not identical, approach to treating 
investments in unlisted equity securities. The regulations can be analyzed in terms of 
reporting, measurement and disclosure. 
Reporting: Use of Fair Value 
In the U.S., reporting of investments in unlisted equity securities (also called “investments 
in closely held companies” or “investments in privately-held companies”) is not regulated by 
SFAS 115 (FASB 1993), which specifically applies to equity securities with “readily 
determinable fair values.”23 Reporting for this category of investments follows Regulation S-
X of the SEC, which requires registered investment companies to value their investments for 
the purposes of financial statements in conformity with the valuation concepts prescribed in 
                                                 
23 SFAS 115 (FASB 1993, para. 3) provides several examples where the fair value of an equity security is readily 
determinable. The main example concerns situations where sales prices or bid-and-asked quotations are available.  
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the 1940 act (Investment Company Act of 1940).24 Investments in companies that are not 
publicly traded are reported at fair value as determined “in good faith by the Board of 
Directors” (1940 Act, section 2, para. 41). Consequently, a major concept in the U.S. 
accounting treatment is the “readily determinable” fair value. 
At international level25, IAS 39 states in the section devoted to financial assets at fair 
value through profit or loss that “investments in equity instruments that do not have a quoted 
market price in an active market, and whose fair value cannot be reliably measured (…), shall 
not be designated as at fair value through profit or loss” (IASB 2003b, para. 9) but “shall be 
measured at cost” (IASB 2003b, para. 46-c). IAS 39 allows fair value reporting of 
investments in unlisted equity instruments, as long as the company believes that their fair 
value can be reliably measured. 
Measurement: Levels of Fair Value 
In the U.S., companies generally use traditional valuation methods to estimate the 
enterprise value of the portfolio company issuing the securities. In September 2006, the FASB 
issued Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (“SFAS 157”) (FASB 2006), which 
provides enhanced guidance on the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities. SFAS 
157 applies whenever other standards require (or allow) assets or liabilities to be measured at 
fair value, but it does not extend the use of fair value to any new circumstances. SFAS 157 is 
effective for fiscal years beginning after November 15, 2007 and is applied by companies 
operating in the private equity industry. 
Under SFAS 157 (FASB 2006, para. 18), valuation techniques consistent with three 
possible approaches (the market approach, income approach, and/or cost approach) must be 
used to measure fair value. The Statement describes the “inputs” to valuation techniques 
(FASB 2006, paras. 21-31), a concept which refers broadly to the assumptions that market 
participants would use. Inputs may be observable or unobservable. Fair values are determined 
by reference to three types of inputs used to measure the asset. The level 1 and 2 categories 
look at observable market data, for instance quoted prices for identical assets for level 1, and 
other observable data such as quoted prices for similar assets for level 2. There is no 
observable market data for the level 3 category: the firm management must rely on its own 
assumptions and judgment.  
                                                 
24 The full text of the act can be downloaded from the SEC website: www.sec.gov/about/laws/ica40.pdf. 
25 Cairns (2006) presents a thorough analysis of the current IAS/IFRS fair value guidance. 
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At the international level, IAS 39 adds that “the fair value of investments in equity 
instruments that do not have a quoted market price in an active market … is reliably 
measurable if (a) the variability in the range of reasonable fair value estimates is not 
significant for that instrument or (b) the probabilities of the various estimates within the range 
can be reasonably assessed and used in estimating fair value" (IASB 2003b, para. AG80). 
These excerpts from IAS 39 imply that investments in unlisted equity instruments can be 
reported at fair value if their fair value can be “reliably measured” (this is confirmed by our 
study of U.K. annual reports – see below). Companies can refer to IAS 39 (para. AG74) 
which states that “if the market for a financial instrument is not active, an entity establishes 
fair value by using a valuation technique. Valuation techniques include using recent arm’s 
length market transactions between knowledgeable, willing parties, if available, reference to 
the current fair value of another instrument that is substantially the same, discounted cash 
flow analysis and option pricing models.” 
 26
 
APPENDIX 2 
Preliminary information given to all participants 
You are an investor specialized in private equity investments. You have the opportunity 
to invest in 24 companies: your offer will be selected if you make the best proposal to the 
seller (call auctions). But be careful: if your price is too high, you will lose money! You have 
an initial available amount of $24,000 in cash. Your goal is to maximize the value of your 
portfolio by the end of the game. The four best results on the market will receive a $225 
award each. For each round, you will have access to basic business and financial information 
on the targeted company. These data will help you in assessing the value of the company’s 
shares (around $1,000 each). This information is not comprehensive, but is critical to help you 
estimate the share price. You must first answer the following question:  
Question 1: What is the price of this company’s share? 
Then, you must decide if you will bid to buy one share or not. 
Question 2: Do you want to buy this share at this value? Yes/no 
If you make an offer, it will be compared to your competitors’ bids26 and you will receive 
one of the two following messages: 
Message 1: Congratulations. Your offer was the highest, and has been accepted. One year 
later, the market value of this share turns out to be $X.27 Therefore, you have made a gain 
(loss) of:  
 Market value (year t+1)  $X 
- Your offer (year t) - $Y 
= Gain (loss) = $(X-Y) 
Message 2: Sorry, your offer is too low. Another investor won the call auction. You make 
0 gain/loss for this round. Your offer was: $Y. The winning offer was: $Z.  
As you can see, you will know the market value for year t+1 AFTER participating in the 
call auction. 
In both cases, you receive a summary of your current operation and all your past 
operations, with the current portfolio value (share value and available cash). You should then 
click on “next round” to continue the game. 
                                                 
26 This sentence is included for the sake of increasing the realism of the experiment. The participants do not 
know that the “market” value is simulated by a model (see Appendix 4). 
27 This value corresponds to the price proposed by another investor one year later. We call this value “market” 
value in the paper.  
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APPENDIX 3 
Excerpts from the simulation 
 
Panel A: Union Food 
 
Audited financial information     
Year ended ($m) 2005 2006 Change   
Sales 27.4 28.6 4%   
Profit/(loss) after tax 1.2 1.3 8%   
Total assets 34.3 34.7 1%   
Business environment       
Overall risk assessment Low       
Business description Manufacture of premium hand-made pastries 
Salient fact Was able to attract new investors in 2005   
Dividends paid Dividends in 2005 and 2006   
Valuation of the projected investment     
Low valuation        
Average valuation 995       
High valuation        
Basis of valuation  Earnings multiple, Discounted cash flows   
 
Panel B: Branlock Bakery 
 
Audited financial information     
Year ended ($m) 2005 2006 Change   
Sales 22.8 23.8 4%   
Profit/(loss) after tax 1 1.1 10%   
Total assets 28.6 28.9 1%   
Business environment       
Overall risk assessment Low       
Business description Manufacture of premium hand-made pastries 
Salient fact Was able to attract new investors in 2005   
Dividends paid Dividends in 2005 and 2006   
Valuation of the projected investment     
Low valuation 939       
Average valuation 995       
High valuation 1052       
Basis of valuation  Earnings multiple, Discounted cash flows   
 
Panel A is based on Limited disclosure, Gain, Low risk. 
Panel B is based on Full disclosure, Gain, Low risk. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Modeling the market (call auction) 
This appendix explains several factors relevant to understanding how the experiment was 
conducted. 
Construction of Scenarios 
The assessment supplied explicitly under “Overall risk assessment” (see Appendix 3) may 
be “high” or “low”. This valuation is reinforced by the following implicit factors, which are 
introduced in different combinations according to the scenarios. 
Business Description 
There are 12 different descriptions, classified according to risk level as follows: 
Low risk High Risk 
Manufacture of industrial doors and curtains Remote telemetry data transmission systems 
Supply of powered access equipment for hire Computer software for ticketing and accounting 
applications 
Provision of training and conference facilities Software developer for business management 
applications 
Manufacture of premium hand-made French pastries Infrastructure installation for mobile telephone 
operators 
Manufacture of air curtains and air handling equipment Laboratory analysis service for clinical trials 
Hire of large crawler cranes to the construction industry Laboratory biological development of new genetic 
therapy 
Salient facts 
Low risk High risk 
Created before 2000 Recapitalization in 2006 
Was able to attract new investors in 2005 Firm created in 2005 
Income 
Low risk High risk 
Dividends in 2005 and 2006 Nil dividends 
 
These combinations are constructed so that the Limited and Full disclosure scenarios can 
be compared directly, all other things being equal. This means that the same description 
(business description, salient facts and income) will occur twice, once for the Limited 
disclosure scenario and once for the Full disclosure scenario. To avoid memorization bias 
(favoring participants who memorized information rather than understood the contents), the 
firm name only is changed each time, and the financial data are approximately multiplied by a 
coefficient of 1.2. The two scenarios will be referred to as a pair (see an example in Appendix 
3). 
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Method for Calculating Disclosed Fair Values and Low and High Valuations 
For each pair of scenarios, the following values are precalculated: values likely to be 
disclosed (Average valuation [i.e., fair value], Low valuation, High valuation) and market 
value (see later in this appendix). The calculation method depends on the domain (gain or loss) 
to which the pair of scenarios belong. 
Potential gain 
This will send a signal that there is a risk of undervaluing the project. There is therefore a 
high likelihood of the market value being higher than the disclosed value. This will be 
modeled by a random drawing from within the interval [0.4; 0.5], whereas the actual value 
(market value) is drawn randomly from within the interval [0.45; 0.55]. This gives the 
following Average disclosed value: 
Average disclosed value = INVERSE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION (p = 0.45+ hazard (± 0.05), average = 1000, 
SD = 100 if Scenario = low risk, 250 if Scenario = high risk) 
The low and high published values are therefore calculated as follows: 
Low (resp. High) valuation = INVERSE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION (p = 0.45+ hazard (± 0.05) – (resp. +) 
0.2; average = 1000; SD = 100 if Scenario = low risk, 250 if Scenario = high risk) 
This is therefore the value drawn from the same normal distribution as market value, but 
with lower (higher) probability in the interval [0.2; 0.3] ([0.6; 0.7]) for the low (high) 
valuation. 
Potential loss 
This will send a signal that there is a risk of overvaluing the project. There is therefore a 
high likelihood of the market value being lower than the disclosed value. This will be 
modeled by a random drawing from within the interval [0.5; 0.6], whereas the actual value 
(market value) is drawn randomly from within the interval [0.45; 0.55]. This gives the 
following Average disclosed value: 
Average disclosed value = INVERSE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION (p = 0.55+ hazard (± 0,05), average = 1000, 
SD = 100 if Scenario = low risk, 250 if Scenario = high risk) 
The low and high published values are therefore calculated as follows: 
Low (resp. High) valuation = INVERSE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION (p = 0.55+ hazard (± 0.05) – (resp. +) 
0.2, average = 1000, SD = 100 if Scenario = low risk, 250 if scenario = high risk) 
This is therefore the value drawn from the same normal distribution as market value, but 
with lower (higher) probability in the interval [0.3; 0.4] ([0.7; 0.8]) for the low (high) 
valuation. 
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Winning Bid 
If the participant decides to participate in the auction, she must be informed whether she 
has won. The decision is determined using the following formula: 
Winning bid = If (GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION (Bid price,1000; SD (100 ou 250)) > 0.4, “Yes”; “No”) 
In other words, if the participant’s bid has an associated probability (calculated based on 
normal distribution with mean 1000 and standard deviation 100 or 250 [depending on the 
level of risk]) greater than 0.4, then she will win the auction.28 
Method for Calculating Market Values 
For each pair of scenarios, all market values are based on $1,000 adjusted by a random 
parameter (uniform law). The formula is as follows: 
Market Value = INVERSE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION (p = 0.5 + hazard (± 0.05); average = 1000; SD = 100 
if Scenario = low risk, 250 if Scenario = high risk) 
The market value is only revealed to the participant after the auction result is announced, 
whether or not she decides to participate. 
Example for Union Food (see Appendix 3) 
 
 
Example of computations: 
Bid price: 999 
Result of the market: Winning bid (highest offer). 
Market value = 1,008. 
Gain (Loss) = Market value – Bid price = 1,008 – 999 = + 9 (gain). 
Return = (Gain [Loss])/Bid price = (1,008 – 999)/999 = 9/999 = 0.9%. 
Disclosed fair value (DFV) = 995 
995 1008 999
Bid price 
+ 4 
Deviation from 
Fair value 
+ 9 
Gain 
Disclosed fair 
value 
Market value 
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Deviation from Disclosed Fair Value (Deviation) = (Bid price – Disclosed fair 
value)/Disclosed fair value = (999 – 995)/995 = + 0.40% 
                                                                                                                                                        
28 This procedure, although it has some common features with Becker-DeGroot-Marshak method (see Becker et 
al. 1964), differs from this method in which the price is determined by a random number generator. 
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TABLE 1 
Disclosure Practice of U.S. and U.K. Companies (Unlisted Equity Investments) 
 GAAP 
applied 
Valuation 
at fair 
value 
Reference 
to the use 
of 
valuation 
techniques 
Detail of the 
cost and fair 
value for each 
investment (or 
each of the 
main 
investments) 
Valuation 
technique used 
for each 
investment (or 
each of the 
main 
investments) 
Sensitivity 
tests 
Range 
of 
values 
Panel A: USA        
American Capital U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Allied Capital U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Ares Capital U.S. Yes No Yes No No No 
MCG Capital U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
PennantPark 
Investment 
U.S. Yes No Yes No No No 
Hercules 
Technology Growth 
Cap 
U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Kohlberg Capital U.S. Yes No Yes No No No 
NGP Capital 
Resources 
U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
MVC Capital U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Patriot Capital 
Funding 
U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Panel B: United 
Kingdom 
       
Foreign & Colonial 
Investment Trust 
U.K. Yes No No No No No 
KKR Private Equity 
Investors 
U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
SVG Capital IFRS Yes Yes** Yes No Yes Yes 
European Capital U.S. Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Electra Private 
Equity 
IFRS Yes Yes** Yes Yes No No 
British Empire 
Securities and 
General Trust 
IFRS Yes Yes** Yes No No No 
British Assets Trust U.K. N/A* N/A* N/A* N/A* N/A* N/A* 
Pantheon 
International 
Participations 
U.K. Yes Yes No No No No 
JZ Equity Partners U.K. Yes Yes** Yes Yes No No 
SVM Global Fund U.K. Yes Yes** Yes No No No 
N/A Not applicable 
Companies sorted by size (total assets). 
* Listed investments only (although retrieved from the Infinancials database with the key word “private equity”). 
** Reference to the “International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Guidelines”. 
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TABLE 2 
Demographic Data 
 
  N mean sd min p50 max 
Age 173 29.55 3.64 23 29 45
Background       
- Business 181 46% 50% 0% 0% 100%
- Economics 181 14% 35% 0% 0% 100%
- Humanities 181 6% 24% 0% 0% 100%
- Science 181 41% 49% 0% 0% 100%
- Other 181 4% 21% 0% 0% 100%
Courses attended       
- Accounting 181 67% 47% 0% 100% 100%
- Financial analysis 181 43% 50% 0% 0% 100%
- Corporate finance 181 57% 50% 0% 100% 100%
- Valuation 181 23% 42% 0% 0% 100%
Previously worked       
- In accounting 181 8% 28% 0% 0% 100%
- In management control 181 10% 30% 0% 0% 100%
- In audit 181 4% 21% 0% 0% 100%
- In a bank 181 13% 34% 0% 0% 100%
- In an investment bank 181 8% 27% 0% 0% 100%
- Other 181 64% 48% 0% 100% 100%
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TABLE 3 
Market liquidity: Offer and Disclosure 
Panel A: Offer and Disclosure - Paired 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Number of 
pairs 
Limited 
disclosure 
Full 
disclosure 
z-Statistic Two-
Tailed 
p-Value 
Paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test 577 a 0.934 0.956 -2.608 0.009
Panel B: Mean (standard deviation) for Offer Low risk High risk  
 Domain = 
Loss 
Domain = 
Gain 
Domain = 
Loss 
Domain = 
Gain 
 
Limited disclosure 0.909 0.979 0.849 0.997  
 (0.270) (0.130) (0.340) (0.041)  
 N = 141 N = 145 N = 142 N = 149  
Full disclosure 0.942 0.976 0.911 0.993  
 (0.224) (0.148) (0.277) (0.082)  
 N = 141 N = 145 N = 142 N = 149  
Panel C: Offer disclosure, domain and risk - 
Repeated Anova - General results 
Number of 
observations 
    
 1154 b     
 Partial Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-Statistic Two-
Tailed 
p-Value 
Disclosure 0.141 1 0.141 4.303 0.038
Domain 1.789 1 1.789 54.528 0.000
Risk 0.105 1 0.105 3.213 0.073
Disclosure x Domain 0.188 1 0.188 5.728 0.017
Disclosure x Risk 0.015 1 0.015 0.469 0.494
Domain x Risk 0.205 1 0.205 6.252 0.013
Disclosure x Domain x Risk 0.015 1 0.015 0.463 0.497
Residual 31.754 968 0.033          .          . 
Panel D: Offer, disclosure, domain and risk - 
Simple effect tests - Analysis of variance 
Partial Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-Statistic Two-
Tailed 
p-Value 
Low risk (Domain = Loss) 0.077 1 0.077 1.258 0.263
Low risk (Domain = Gain) 0.001 1 0.001 0.044 0.833
High risk (Domain = Loss) 0.275 1 0.275 2.854 0.092
High risk (Domain = Gain) 0.001 1 0.001 0.200 0.655
 
a Number of complete pairs. 
b Observations corresponding to the complete pairs (577 * 2 = 1,154). 
Presentation of the experiment and definition of the variables 
Each of the 181 participants is asked to participate in 24 different auctions. Given a set of information, the 
participant has to assess the value of the firm and post her bid price. The participant is then asked if she wishes to 
participate in an auction for the share. We manipulate three variables: the information on fair value 
measurements (point estimate in Limited disclosure, versus point estimate plus a range of values in Full 
disclosure), the domain of the decisions (Gain versus Loss) and the business risk (Low versus High).  
Offer measures the willingness to take part in the auction and is coded one when the participant decides to make 
an offer and zero otherwise.  
 39
TABLE 4 
Reliability of accounting numbers: Deviation from Disclosed Fair Value and Disclosure 
Panel A: Deviation and Disclosure - Paired 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Number of 
pairs 
Limited 
disclosure 
Full 
disclosure 
z-Statistic Two-
Tailed p-
Value 
Paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test 541 a -0.025 -0.033 3.511 0.000
Panel B: Mean (standard deviation) for 
Deviation 
Low risk High risk  
 Domain = 
Loss 
Domain = 
Gain 
Domain = 
Loss 
Domain = 
Gain 
 
Limited disclosure -0.038 -0.005 -0.068 0.001  
 (0.038) (0.026) (0.051) (0.018)  
 N = 129 N = 142 N = 122 N = 148  
Full disclosure -0.036 -0.014 -0.091 -0.002  
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.056) (0.057)  
 N = 129 N = 142 N = 122 N = 148  
Panel C: Deviation disclosure, domain and 
risk - Repeated Anova - General results 
Number of 
observations 
    
 1082 b     
 Partial Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-Statistic Two-
Tailed p-
Value 
Disclosure 0.019 1 0.019 13.161 0.000
Domain 0.702 1 0.702 475.844 0.000
Risk 0.069 1 0.069 47.009 0.000
Disclosure x Domain 0.001 1 0.001 0.944 0.331
Disclosure x Risk 0.006 1 0.006 4.250 0.040
Domain x Risk 0.155 1 0.155 105.096 0.000
Disclosure x Domain x Risk 0.016 1 0.016 10.985 0.001
Residual 1.323 897 0.001          .          . 
Panel D: Deviation, disclosure, domain and 
risk - Simple effect tests - Analysis of 
variance 
Partial Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-Statistic Two-
Tailed p-
Value 
Low risk (Domain = Loss) 0.000 1 0.000 0.183 0.669
Low risk (Domain = Gain) 0.006 1 0.006 8.709 0.003
High risk (Domain = Loss) 0.033 1 0.033 11.632 0.001
High risk (Domain = Gain) 0.001 1 0.001 0.445 0.505
 
a Number of complete pairs when the participant made an offer. 
b Observations corresponding to the complete pairs when the participant made an offer (541 * 2 = 1,082). 
Presentation of the experiment and definition of the variables 
Each of the 181 participants is asked to participate in 24 different auctions. Given a set of information, the 
participant has to assess the value of the firm and post her bid price. The participant is then asked if she wishes to 
participate in an auction for the share. We manipulate three variables: the information on fair value 
measurements (point estimate in Limited disclosure, versus point estimate plus a range of values in Full 
disclosure), the domain of the decisions (Gain versus Loss) and the business risk (Low versus High).  
Deviation is the Deviation from Disclosed Fair Value (Deviation). It represents the difference between the bid 
price proposed by the participant and the disclosed fair value of the asset as determined by valuation techniques, 
scaled by this fair value to allow comparisons.  
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TABLE 5 
Relevance: Return and Disclosure 
Panel A: Return and Disclosure - Paired 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Number of 
pairs 
Limited 
disclosure 
Full 
disclosure 
z-Statistic Two-
Tailed 
p-Value 
Paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test 577 a 0.010 0.007 3.000 0.003
Panel B: Mean (standard deviation) for Return Low risk High risk  
 Domain = 
Loss 
Domain = 
Gain 
Domain = 
Loss 
Domain = 
Gain 
 
Limited disclosure 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.026  
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)  
 N = 141 N = 145 N = 142 N = 149  
Full disclosure 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.014  
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.033)  
 N = 141 N = 145 N = 142 N = 149  
Panel C: Return, disclosure, domain and risk - 
Repeated Anova - General results 
Number of 
observations 
    
 1154 b     
 Partial Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-Statistic Two-
Tailed 
p-Value 
Disclosure 0.002 1 0.002 7.696 0.006
Domain 0.025 1 0.025 83.763 0.000
Risk 0.008 1 0.008 25.933 0.000
Disclosure x Domain 0.003 1 0.003 8.265 0.004
Disclosure x Risk 0.004 1 0.004 14.071 0.000
Domain x Risk 0.016 1 0.016 52.893 0.000
Disclosure x Domain x Risk 0.001 1 0.001 4.702 0.030
Residual 0.294 968 0.000          .          . 
Panel D: Return, disclosure, domain and risk - 
Simple effect tests - Analysis of variance 
Partial Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-Statistic Two-
Tailed 
p-Value 
Low risk (Domain = Loss) 0.000 1 0.000 1.426 0.233
Low risk (Domain = Gain) 0.000 1 0.000 0.027 0.869
High risk (Domain = Loss) 0.000 1 0.000 0.472 0.493
High risk (Domain = Gain) 0.011 1 0.011 15.273 0.000
 
a Number of complete pairs. 
b Observations corresponding to the complete pairs (577 * 2 = 1,154). 
Presentation of the experiment and definition of the variables 
Each of the 181 participants is asked to participate in 24 different auctions. Given a set of information, the 
participant has to assess the value of the firm and post her bid price. The participant is then asked if she wishes to 
participate in an auction for the share. We manipulate three variables: the information on fair value 
measurements (point estimate in Limited disclosure, versus point estimate plus a range of values in Full 
disclosure), the domain of the decisions (Gain versus Loss) and the business risk (Low versus High).  
Return measures the return on investment for each round. If a participant decided to make an offer and if this 
offer was accepted, the Return is computed as the difference between the market value of the asset as simulated 
by our experimental model and the bid price proposed by the participant, scaled by this bid price to allow 
comparisons. If the participant decided not to make an offer or if her offer was rejected, Return is set to zero. 
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FIGURE 1 
Experimental design (for each round) 
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